This market is about how much of Russia’s frozen central bank reserves in the West end up being used to support Ukraine — either directly (transfers) or indirectly (loans backed by these assets, or their investment income).

Background

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, G7 countries and the EU froze a large part of the Russian Central Bank’s foreign reserves. As summarized in the Wikipedia article “Confiscation of Russian central bank funds”, G7+EU governments stated in May 2023 that around US$300 billion (≈€275 billion) in Russian central bank assets had been immobilized and would remain frozen until Russia pays for the damage it caused to Ukraine.
Most of these reserves are held in Europe, especially via Euroclear in Belgium. The assets generate several billion euros per year in interest income, some of which is already being channelled to Ukraine, and proposals exist to use the assets (or their income) to secure large “reparations loans” to Ukraine.

For definiteness, this market uses US$300 billion as the fixed denominator (“Russia’s frozen central bank reserves”) regardless of later revisions to the estimated total. If the total is > 100% (because of the fixed denominator, it can happen), the question resolves to 100%
The question resolves 1.1.2031 according to state at that time.

What counts as “used to support Ukraine”?

For the numerator, I will sum (all values in USD equivalent at the time of the official figure):

1. Outright confiscation & transfer of principal

   • Any part of the frozen Russian central bank reserves that is:

     • confiscated or permanently seized, and

     • transferred to:

       • the Government of Ukraine, or

       • an international fund or mechanism where the money is legally earmarked for Ukraine’s reconstruction, budget support, or similar.

   • This includes cases where states legally substitute themselves as creditors of Russia but Ukraine gets the money.

2. Loans whose principal is effectively paid for by Russian state assets

   • The face value of loans to or strictly for the benefit of Ukraine that:

     • are funded or secured specifically by the frozen Russian central bank assets or by their investment proceeds (e.g. the G7 “ERA” loan backed by income from immobilised Russian assets), and

     • do not require Ukraine to repay from its own resources in the long run, except possibly if Russia pays reparations.

   • Examples that would count:

     • A “reparations loan” structure where Ukraine receives funds now, debt service is paid from interest on the frozen Russian assets, and the principal is only repaid by Russia as part of a peace settlement.

   • I will count such loans at their disbursed principal amount (not interest), to the extent that they are clearly tied to the Russian assets/income by official documentation.

3. Interest / profits on the frozen assets used for Ukraine

   • The cumulative amount of net investment income, interest, or “windfall” profits generated by the frozen Russian central bank reserves that:

     • has actually been transferred to Ukraine, or

     • has been paid into EU/G7 funds that are legally earmarked for Ukraine (reconstruction, budget, or military support).

   • Example: profits earned at Euroclear on immobilised Russian reserves and then taxed or appropriated for Ukraine.

Important exclusions / edge cases

• The market is only about Russian central bank / sovereign reserves, not about private oligarch assets, yachts, etc.

• Mere freezing of assets (without them or their income benefiting Ukraine) does not count.

• Schemes that only use the assets as political leverage in negotiations, but do not end up sending money or funded services to Ukraine, do not count.

• If a loan is backed by Russian assets but Ukraine is expected to repay from its normal budget (like any other sovereign loan), it does not count.

• If it’s unclear whether some mechanism is funded from Russian reserves versus general EU/G7 budgets, I will only count the clearly attributable portion.

This market is not about:

• Total reparations Russia may owe under international law.

• How much the West spends on Ukraine from its own budgets.

• Private Russian assets (oligarchs, companies, etc.) unless they are explicitly commingled and indistinguishable from central bank reserves in a scheme clearly documented as such.